Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets presented at CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics, March 2007
Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platfor...
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Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a.
2007
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Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Industrial organisation
2011 |
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Zusammenfassung: | Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities. |
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Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 33 - 35 |
Beschreibung: | 35 S graph. Darst. 21 cm |