On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition

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Veröffentlicht in:Social choice and welfare
1. Verfasser: Pritchard, Geoffrey (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Slinko, Arkadii (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: 2006
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