A probabilistic model of social choice

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Russian contributions to game theory and equilibrium theory
1. Verfasser:	Yanovskaya, E. B. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2006
Schlagworte:	Neue politische Ökonomie > Abstimmungsregel > Spieltheorie > Theorie > Aufsatz im Buch
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
Stability of economic equilibrium	2006	Zak, F. L.
Cores and generalized NM-solutions for some classes of cooperative games	2006	Vasil'ev, V. A.
A probabilistic model of social choice	2006	Yanovskaya, E. B.
On the superlinear bargaining solution	2006	Pechersky, S.
The linear bargaining solution	2006	Pechersky, S.
Stable compromises under corrupt arbitration	2006	Kukushikin, N.S.
Equilibrated states and theorems on the core	2006	Danilov, V. I.
An algorithmic approach for searching an equilibrium in fixed budget exchange models	2006	Shmyre͏̈v, V. I.
Equilibrium points in general noncooperative games and their mixed extensions	2006	Yanovskaya, E. B.
On the theory of optimality principles for noncooperative games	2006	Lapickij, Viktor Evgenʹevič
A sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core of a cooperative game with its solution	2006	Diubin, G.
On the Shapley function for games with an infinite number of players	2006	Diubin, G.