Competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The political economy of monetary institutions |
|---|---|
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
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2003
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Tag hinzufügen | Titel | Jahr | Verfasser |
|---|---|---|
| Political parties and monetary commitments | 2003 | Bernhard, William |
| Partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital | 2003 | Clark, William Roberts |
| Veto players and the choice of monetary institutions | 2003 | Hallerberg, Mark |
| Competing commitments : technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions | 2003 | Freeman, John R. |
| The political economy of monetary institutions | 2003 | Bernhard, William |
| Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments | 2003 | Keefer, Philip |
| Real sources of European currency policy : sectoral interest and European monetary integration | 2003 | Frieden, Jeffry A. |
| Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes | 2003 | Broz, J. Lawrence |