Optimal rent extraction in pre-industrial England and France default risk and monitoring costs

Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, England changed its system of raising revenues from tax farming, combined with the granting of monopolies, to direct collection within the government administration. Rents were then transferred from tax farmers and monopolists to the central government such...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Priks, Mikael (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2005
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Public finance 1464
Schlagworte:
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