Burden sharing, strategy, and the design of NATO

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The theory of public choice, II
1. Verfasser: Sandler, Todd (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Forbes, John F. (VerfasserIn)
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Veröffentlicht: 1984
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