Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Bisin, Alberto (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Gottardi, Piero (VerfasserIn), Rampini, Adriano A. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2004
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Industrial organisation 1322
Schlagworte:
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