Implementation and strong Nash-equilibrium

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Veröffentlicht in:Aggregation and revelation of preferences
1. Verfasser: Maskin, Eric (VerfasserIn)
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Veröffentlicht: 1979
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Titel Jahr Verfasser
Efficient collective choice with compensation 1979 Groves, Theodore
Rationing and Lindahl equilibria 1979 Champsaur, Paul
A differential approach to expected utility maximizing mechanisms 1979 Laffont, Jean-Jacques
Intermediate preferences and the majority rule 1979 Grandmont, Jean-Michel
The characterization of implementable choice rules 1979 Roberts, Kevin
Strategic behaviour in a discrete-time procedure 1979 Schoumaker, Françoise
Some more results on consistency, reationality and collective choice 1979 Bordes, Georges
Elements for new insights into the Gibbrad-Stterthwaite theorem 1979 Batteau, Pierre
An analysis and comparison of several necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity under the majority decision rule 1979 Gaertner, Wulf
Strategic behavior in the MDP planning procedure 1979 Roberts, John
Equity, nonfeasible alternatives and social choice : a reconsideration of the concept of social welfare 1979 Pazner, Elisha A.
Separability, risk-bearing and social welfare judgements 1979 Deschamps, Robert
Identifying the free rider problem 1979 Münch, Thomas
Dominant strategy mechanisms and incomplete information 1979 Ledyard, John
Maximin strategies and elicitation of preferences 1979 Thomson, William
On allocations attainable through Nash-equilibria 1979 Hurwicz, Leonid
Implementation and strong Nash-equilibrium 1979 Maskin, Eric
Strategies and revelation : informational constraints in public decisions 1979 Sen, Amartya
Voting by veto 1979 Mueller, Dennis C.
Symmetric and consistent aggregation with dichotomous voting 1979 Fishburn, Peter C.
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