The impact of supervisory disclosure on the supervisory process: will bank supervisors be less likely to downgrade banks?

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Market discipline in banking
1. Verfasser:	Feldman, Ron J. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Jagtiani, Julapa (VerfasserIn), Schmidt, Jason (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2003
Schlagworte:	Bankenaufsicht > Unternehmenspublizität > USA > Aufsatz im Buch
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