Constitutional public choice

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Perspectives on public choice
1. Verfasser:	Mueller, Dennis C. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	1997
Schlagworte:	Verfassungsökonomik > Abstimmungsregel > Theorie > Aufsatz im Buch
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Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
Why does government's share of national income grow? : An assessment of the recent literature on the US experience	1997	Holsey, Cheryl M.
The positive theory of public bureaucracy	1997	Moe, Terry M.
Modern bureaucratic theory	1997	Wintrobe, Ronald
Political business cycles	1997	Paldam, Martin
Multiparty electoral politics	1997	Schofield, Norman
Group choice and individual judgments	1997	Young, H. Peyton
Neither markets nor states : linking transformation processes in collective action arenas	1997	Ostrom, Elinor
Economic theories of the state	1997	Hardin, Russell
Public choice in perspective	1997	Mueller, Dennis C.
[Rezension von: Perspectives on public choice, Dennis C. Mueller (ed.)]	1997	Feld, Lars P.
Endogenous protection : the empirical evidence	1997	Magee, Stephen P.
Voting behavior	1997	Fiorina, Morris P.
When is it rational to vote?	1997	Aldrich, John Herbert
Majority rule	1997	Rae, Douglas W.
Cycling and majority rule	1997	Enelow, James M.
Rent seeking	1997	Tollison, Robert D.
Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities	1997	Tideman, T. Nicolaus
Some paradoxes of preference aggregation	1997	Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
Constitutional public choice	1997	Mueller, Dennis C.
The public choice of international organizations	1997	Frey, Bruno S.