| What makes markets predict well? : evidence from the Iowa electronic markets
|
1996 |
Berg, Joyce E. |
| Theory, field, and laboratory : the continuing dialogue
|
1996 |
Ostrom, Elinor |
| Adaptation of aspiration levels : theory and experiment
|
1996 |
Tietz, Reinhard |
| Recurring bullies, trembling and learning
|
1996 |
Jackson, Matthew O. |
| Communication effort in teams and in games
|
1996 |
Friedman, Eric |
| Admissibility and stability
|
1996 |
Wilson, Robert |
| Equilibrium selection in team games
|
1996 |
Damme, Eric E. C. van |
| Endowment effect for risky assets
|
1996 |
Loomes, Graham |
| Induction vs deterrence in the chain store game : how many potential entrants are needed to deter entry?
|
1996 |
Sundali, James A. |
| Credible threats of secession, partnership, and commonwealths
|
1996 |
Reny, Philip J. |
| Finite convergence of the core in a piecewise linear market game
|
1996 |
Rosenmüller, Joachim |
| Reinhard Selten meets the classics
|
1996 |
Güth, Werner |
| Dumb bugs vs. bright noncooperative players : a comparison
|
1996 |
Quint, Thomas |
| Strict and symmetric correlated equilibria are the distributions of the ESS's of biological conflicts with asymmetric roles
|
1996 |
Shmida, Avi |
| Evolutionary conflict and the design of life
|
1996 |
Hammerstein, Peter |
| Games of incomplete information : the inconsistent case
|
1996 |
Mashler, Mikhaʾel |
| Intertemporal speculation under uncertain future demand : experimental results
|
1996 |
Plott, Charles |
| Sequencing and the size of the budget : experimental evidence
|
1996 |
Gardner, Roy J. |
| On styles of relating to bargaining partners
|
1996 |
Ostmann, Axel |
| Reciprocity: the behavioral foundations of socio-economic games
|
1996 |
Hoffman, Elizabeth |
Tag hinzufügen