The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Symposium on noncooperative bargaining
1. Verfasser:	Gresik, Thomas A. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Satterthwaite, Mark Allen (BerichterstatterIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Verhandlungen > Informationsökonomik > Wohlfahrtsökonomik > Theorie > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Introduction: symposium on noncooperative bargaining		Linhart, Peter B.
A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information		Ausubel, Lawrence M.
The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases : an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms		Gresik, Thomas A.
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