Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Game-theoretic models of bargaining
1. Verfasser:	Fudenberg, Drew (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Levine, David K. (BerichterstatterIn), Tirole, Jean (BerichterstatterIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	1985
Schlagworte:	Aufsatz im Buch
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Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
[Rezension von: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, A. E. Roth (ed.)]	1988	Damme, Eric E. C. van
Bargaining and coalitions	1985	Binmore, Ken
Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population : a survey of recent results	1985	Thomson, William
Sequential bargaining mechanisms	1985	Cramton, Peter C.
Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information	1985	Rubinstein, Ariel
A comment on the Coase theorem	1985	Samuelson, William
Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes : who should bear the burden of proof?	1985	Sobel, Joel
The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives	1985	Crawford, Vincent P.
The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model	1985	Osborne, Martin J.
Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information	1985	Myerson, Roger B.
Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information	1985	Fudenberg, Drew
Reputations in games and markets	1985	Wilson, Robert
An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining	1985	Rosenthal, Robert W.
Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining	1985	Hart, Sergiu
Toward a focal point theory of bargaining	1985	Roth, Alvin E.
Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions	1985	Tijs, Stef
Disagreement in bargaining : models with incomplete information	1985	Chatterjee, Kalyan