Algorithmic Game Theory 14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Aarhus, Denmark, September 21–24, 2021, proceedings

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Körperschaft: SAGT (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Caragiannis, Ioannis (HerausgeberIn), Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt (HerausgeberIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Cham Springer 2021
Schriftenreihe:Lecture notes in computer science 12885
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Titel Jahr Verfasser
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents 2021 Ezra, Tomer
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games 2021 Goldberg, Paul W.
Gerrymandering on Graphs: Computational Complexity and Parameterized Algorithms 2021 Gupta, Sushmita
Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets 2021 Correa, José
Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees 2021 Noel, Jonathan A.
Vote Delegation and MisbehaviorVote Delegation and Misbehavior 2021 Gersbach, Hans
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming 2021 Ahunbay, Mete Seref
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values 2021 Gkatzelis, Vasilis
On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games 2021 Könemann, Jochen
Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values 2021 Garg, Jugal
An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy 2021 Markakis, Evangelos
On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap (Abstract) 2021 Chekuri, Chandra
Game Theory on the Blockchain: A Model for Games with Smart Contracts 2021 Hall-Andersen, Mathias
On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching 2021 Chen, Jiehua
The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences 2021 McKay, Michael
Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets 2021 Gollapudi, Sreenivas
Hedonic Expertise Games 2021 Caskurlu, Bugra
Metric-Distortion Bounds Under Limited Information 2021 Anagnostides, Joannis
When Dividing Mixed Manna Is Easier Than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores 2021 Garg, Jugal
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation 2021 Amer, Ameer
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