A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability
|
2020 |
Danau, Daniel |
Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
|
2020 |
Abe, Takaaki |
Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
|
2020 |
Ausubel, Lawrence M. |
The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games
|
2020 |
Jong, Jasper de |
Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
|
2020 |
Āzacis, Helmuts |
Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing : theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence
|
2020 |
Güth, Werner |
Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game
|
2020 |
Rachmilevitch, Shiran |
Bill Sandholm in Memoriam
|
2020 |
Samuelson, Larry |
Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies
|
2020 |
Braggion, Eleonora |
Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
|
2020 |
Becerril-Borja, Rubén |
Analytical solution of kth price auction
|
2020 |
Mihelich, Martin |
Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
|
2020 |
Tsuchihashi, Toshihiro |
A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
|
2020 |
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman |
Non-emptiness of the alpha-core : sufficient and necessary conditions
|
2020 |
Basile, Achille |
A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
|
2020 |
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. |
Should I remember more than you? : best responses to factored strategies
|
2020 |
Levínský, René |
Fair division in the presence of externalities
|
2020 |
Skibski, Oskar |
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
|
2020 |
Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo |
Associated consistency, value and graphs
|
2020 |
Hamiache, Gérard |
Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
|
2020 |
Pradelski, Bary S. R. |