Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior
1. Verfasser:	Feldman, Michal (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Fu, Hu (VerfasserIn), Gravin, Nikolai (VerfasserIn), Lucier, Brendan (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2020
Schlagworte:	Allocative efficiency > Auctions > Cost-benefit analysis noncooperative games > asymmetric and private information > Mechanism design > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Titel	Jahr	Band
Special section on Algorithmic game theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012	2019	volume 113 (January 2019)
Special issue in honor of Lloyd Shapley : eight topics in game theory	2018	volume 108 (March 2018)
John Nash memorial	2017	volume 103 (May 2017)
Special issue in honor of John O. Ledyard	2017	volume 101 (January 2017)
Special issue in honor of John Nash	2011	71.2011,1
Special issue in honor of Robert Aumann	2010	69.2010,1
Special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai	2010	70.2010,1
Special issue in honor of Martin Shubik	2009	65.2009,1
Special issue : second world congress of the Game Theory Society	2008	63.2008,2
Special issue in honor of Michael B. Maschler	2008	64.2008,2
Special issue on neuroeconomics	2005	52.2005,2
Special issue in honor of Richard D. McKelvey	2005	51.2005,2
Special issue in honor of David Schmeidler	2005	50.2005,1
Special issue: First World Congress of the Game Theory Society	2003	45.2003,1
Special issue in honor of Robert W. Rosenthal	2003	45.2003,2
Special issue: Economics and artificial intelligence	2001	35.2001,1/2
Special issue on learning in games : a symposium in honor of David Blackwell	1999	29.1999,1/2
Special issue: Robert J. Aumann : Part 2	1998	24.1998,1/2
Special issue: Social organization and mechanism design	1998	25.1998,2