| Allocation mechanisms, incentives, and endemic institutional externalities
|
2019 |
Hammond, Peter J. |
| The role of (quasi) analyticity in establishing completeness of financial markets equilibria
|
2019 |
Kannai, Yakar |
| Are we there yet? : mechanism design beyond equilibrium
|
2019 |
Van Essen, Matthew |
| Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
|
2019 |
Edelman, Paul H. |
| Self-implementation of social coice correspondences in strong equilibrium
|
2019 |
Peleg, Bezalel |
| Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
|
2019 |
Saijō, Tatsuyoshi |
| Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
|
2019 |
Aspremont, Claude d' |
| Formation of committees through random voting rules
|
2019 |
Roy, Souvik |
| Mechanisms in a digitalized world
|
2019 |
Demange, Gabrielle |
| Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
|
2019 |
Chiu, Jonathan |
| Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms : a characterization for the two-alternative case
|
2019 |
Barberà, Salvador |
| In lieu of an introduction : how I remember Leonid Hurwicz
|
2019 |
Trockel, Walter |
| The Hurwicz program, past and suggestions for the future
|
2019 |
Postlewaite, Andrew |
| Social networks from a designer's viewpoint
|
2019 |
Vega-Redondo, Fernando |
| Recent results on implementation with complete information
|
2019 |
Dutta, Bhaskar |
| Technical change and the decentralization penalty
|
2019 |
Marschak, Thomas A. |
| Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
|
2019 |
Hurwicz, Leonid |
| Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement
|
2019 |
Ledyard, John O. |
| Equal area rule to adjudicate conflicting claims
|
2019 |
Thomson, William |
| Contextual mechanism design
|
2019 |
La Mura, Pierfrancesco |
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