| Block-recursive equilibria in heterogeneous-agent models
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2023 |
Kaas, Leo |
| Private disclosure with multiple agents
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2023 |
Zhu, Shuguang |
| Speculation in procurement auctions
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2023 |
Deng, Shanglyu |
| Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
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2023 |
Battigalli, Pierpaolo |
| The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning
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2023 |
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun |
| Regulating oligopolistic competition
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2023 |
Yang, Kai Hao |
| Information design in optimal auctions
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2023 |
Chen, Yi-chun |
| Self-evident events and the value of linking
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2023 |
Chan, Jimmy |
| Market-making with search and information frictions
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2023 |
Lester, Benjamin |
| Optimal contest design : tuning the heat
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2023 |
Letina, Igor |
| On perfect pairwise stable networks
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2023 |
Bich, Philippe |
| Epidemics with behavior
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2023 |
Carnehl, Christoph |
| Communication with endogenous deception costs
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2023 |
Eilat, Ran |
| Motivated naivete
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2023 |
Tang, Rui |
| The strategic decentralization of recruiting
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2023 |
Chen, Yi |
| Random quasi-linear utility
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2023 |
Yang, Erya |
| Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
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2023 |
Liu, Bin |
| Legislative informational lobbying
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2023 |
Dellis, Arnaud |
| The Luce model with replicas
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2023 |
Faro, José Heleno |
| Rational inattention in the frequency domain
|
2023 |
Jurado, Kyle |
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