Spending to win political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies
"Democratic institutions ostensibly serve the common good. Yet democratically elected leaders face varied incentives. Politicians must balance the public's welfare with demands from interest groups that run counter to the common good. Nowhere is this balancing act more apparent than in the...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press
2018
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| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | "Democratic institutions ostensibly serve the common good. Yet democratically elected leaders face varied incentives. Politicians must balance the public's welfare with demands from interest groups that run counter to the common good. Nowhere is this balancing act more apparent than in the area of economic policy. Many economic policies redistribute resources between groups. Governments collect taxes and redistribute the money via government programs. Governments could spend money on programs that support broad groups, such as universal health care or education. Alternatively, governments could use their fiscal resources to privilege small, select groups of citizens via programs like subsidies for business. Subsidies typically provide economic benefits selectively to small groups and accordingly can be described as "particularistic" economic policies. Particularistic economic policies often come at a cost to larger groups, including tax payers and consumers. Yet despite these characteristics, particularistic economic policies emerge in democratic contexts"-- Who gets what and why? The politics of particularistic economic policies -- The uneven geographic dispersion of economic activity -- How institutions and geography work together to shape policy -- Explaining government spending on industrial subsidies -- The power of producers : successful demands for state aid -- Why institutional differences among proportional representation systems matter -- The policy effects of electoral competitiveness in closed-list PR -- Conclusion and Implications |
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| Beschreibung: | xi, 248 Seiten Diagramme 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781108422321 978-1-108-42232-1 9781108432030 978-1-108-43203-0 |