On lattice and DA

We present an application where, in a matching market, Preferences of one side of the market evolve all along the process of the sequential version of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm, producing an agenda-dependent and stable outcome. We also provide an example where agents stable matching wit...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International Conference Dynamics Games and Science (3. : 2014 : Porto, Portugal) Trends in mathematical economics
1. Verfasser:	Cantala, David (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2016
Schlagworte:	Deferred acceptance > Matching with contracts > Kongressbeitrag > Aufsatz im Buch
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Zusammenfassung:	We present an application where, in a matching market, Preferences of one side of the market evolve all along the process of the sequential version of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm, producing an agenda-dependent and stable outcome. We also provide an example where agents stable matching within the set of achievable matchings. The motivation for this application is simply to show that the original DA algorithm is more versatile than suggested by Hatfield and Milgrom(2005).
ISBN:	9783319325415 3319325418