Comments on the foundations of incomplete contracts
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2016 |
Maskin, Eric |
GH and applied theory
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2016 |
Hubbard, Thomas N. |
Incomplete contracts and firm boundaries : new directions
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2016 |
Dessein, Wouter |
The theory of the firm goes global
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2016 |
Marin, Dalia |
Incomplete contracts and not-for-profit firms
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2016 |
Grout, Paul A. |
Incomplete contracting and the design of constitutions
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2016 |
Tabellini, Guido Enrico |
Complexity and undescribability
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2016 |
Najjar, Nabil I. al- |
Discussion of "contracts, ownership, and industrial organization: past and future" by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
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2016 |
Dewatripont, Mathias |
Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control"
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2016 |
Benmelech, Efraim |
Discussion of "contracts, ownership, and industrial organization: past and future" by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
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2016 |
Kühn, Kai-Uwe |
Grossman-Hart (1986) as a theory of markets
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2016 |
Holmström, Bengt |
Why the incomplete contract approach is important for finance
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2016 |
Zingales, Luigi |
Oliver Hart's contributions to the understanding of strategic alliances and technology licensing
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2016 |
Lerner, Joshua |
Incomplete contracts and venture capital
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2016 |
Kaplan, Steven N. |
Grossman-Hart (1986) goes global : incomplete contracts, property rights, and the international organization of production
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2016 |
Antràs, Pol |
Ex ante anonymity and government allocation of property rights
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2016 |
Pitchford, Rohan |
Political treaties as incomplete contracts
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2016 |
Harstad, Bård |
Some recent experimental evidence on contracts as reference points
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2016 |
Schmidt, Klaus M. |
Comments on Aghion, Bloom, and Van Reenen, "incomplete contracts and the internal organization of firms"
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2016 |
Roberts, John |
Corporate finance, incomplete contracts, and corporate control
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2016 |
Bolton, Patrick |