Why do firms sit on cash? an asymmetric information approach

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Veröffentlicht in:The review of corporate finance studies
1. Verfasser: Harris, Milton (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Raviv, Artur (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: September 2017
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