Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

von Ma, Will
Veröffentlicht in Operations research letters (2020)

PRIOR-FREE DYNAMIC AUCTIONS WITH LOW REGRET BUYERS

von Deng, Yuan
Veröffentlicht in NeurIPS (33. : 2019 : Vancouver, British Columbia) 32nd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019) ; Volume 7 of 20 (2020)

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales

von Devanur, Nikhil
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2019)

The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

von Chawla, Shuchi
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2015)

STRATEGIZING AGAINST NO-REGRET LEARNERS

von Deng, Yuan
Veröffentlicht in NeurIPS (33. : 2019 : Vancouver, British Columbia) 32nd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019) ; Volume 2 of 20 (2020)

Optimal crowdsourcing contests

von Chawla, Shuchi
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2019)

Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer

von Deng, Yuan
Veröffentlicht in ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (34. : 2023 : Florenz; Online) Thirty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2023) ; Volume 1 of 7 (2023)

LEARNING TO PRICE AGAINST A MOVING TARGET

von LEME, RENATO PAES
Veröffentlicht in International Conference on Machine Learning (38. : 2021 : Online) International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2021 ; Part 8 of 16 (2022)

Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values

von Chawla, Shuchi
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2022)

Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization

von Leme, Renato Paes
Veröffentlicht in ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (34. : 2023 : Florenz; Online) Thirty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2023) ; Volume 1 of 7 (2023)

Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms

von Beyhaghi, Hedyeh
Veröffentlicht in Operations research (2021)