Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Proiecticn Bias

von Oren, Sigal
Veröffentlicht in WINE (17. : 2021 : Online) Web and Internet Economics (2022)

Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods

von Oren, Sigal
Veröffentlicht in WINE (17. : 2021 : Online) Web and Internet Economics (2022)

Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions : the two-items case

von Lavi, Ron
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2012)

How bad is forming your own opinion?

von Bindel, David
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2015)

Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents : the role of loss aversion and changing reference points

von Kleinberg, Jon
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2022)

Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect

von Babaioff, Moshe
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2022)

Economic efficiency requires interaction

von Dobzinski, Shahar
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2019)

STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR SUNK COST BIAS

von Kleinberg, Jon
Veröffentlicht in Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (37. : 2021 : Online) 37th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2021) ; Part 2 of 3 (2022)