THE COMPLEXITY OF CLONING CANDIDATES IN MULTIWINNER ELECTIONS

von Neveling, Marc
Veröffentlicht in AAMAS (19. : 2020 : Online) International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020) ; Volume 2 of 3 (2021)

The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters

von Neveling, Marc
Veröffentlicht in International Computer Science Symposium (15. : 2020 : Online) Computer science - theory and applications (2020)

The Possible Winner Problem with Uncertain Weights Revisited.

von Neveling, Marc
Veröffentlicht in FCT (23. : 2021 : Online) Fundamentals of computation theory (2021)