On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Economics letters (2020)

On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

von Chen, Yajing
Veröffentlicht in Operations research letters (2021)

Responsive affirmative action in school choice : a comparison study

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Economics letters (2019)

School choice with priority-based affirmative action : A responsive solution

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Journal of mathematical economics (2021)

Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Economics letters (2018)

The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Games and economic behavior (2017)

The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Economics letters (2015)

A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice

von Chen, Yajing
Veröffentlicht in Operations research letters (2022)

Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand

von Chen, Yajing
Veröffentlicht in Economics letters (2021)

The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

von Jiao, Zhenhua
Veröffentlicht in Mathematical social sciences (2016)

Affirmative action under common school priorities : the top trading cycles mechanism case

von Chen, Yajing
Veröffentlicht in Operations research letters (2019)

Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure

von Chen, Yajing
Veröffentlicht in Operations research letters (2023)

Zhong guo zai hai zhi : duan dai juan : sui tang wu dai juan

Veröffentlicht 201904